Social Science Research Council

Comments by Daniel Benjamin CSIS

Transcript by: ACE Transcription Washington D.C.


Daniel Benjamin: Well, thanks for having me. This is about the first time in months that I haven't had to talk about what the FBI knew and when it knew it. So if I stumble a little bit, I hope you'll be generous in your behavior.

Let me run through quickly sort of the history of the Clinton administration and use of force, actual or contemplated, in dealing with acts of terrorism. As many of you recall, terrorism was an unexpected but nonetheless significant guest of the Clinton administration from the very beginning. In fact, is it tonight that Mir Amal Kanzi is going to be executed? Was it last night?

Several voices: It was last night.

Daniel Benjamin: And Kansi's attack happened, I think, five days after the inauguration, when he killed several people on line outside the CIA. Shortly thereafter came the bombing of the World Trade Center.

But the first case in which the United States used force during the Clinton administration period and in relation to terrorism was when several Iraqi intelligence agents were found to be plotting an assassination attempt against former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait. And the response was the cruise missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters, I believe, in April of 1993. That attack was interesting because of all the cases in which force was used or contemplated, I believe, it was the only time that the Clinton administration did not use the argument of preemptive self-defense.

In 1996, Khobar Towers was bombed, and this did not result in a discussion immediately about use of force because quite simply, we didn't know who'd done it. It took some time before it became clear that it was done with the support of senior officials in Iran. And this caused a great deal of debate within the administration as to how the U.S. would react. The decision was made not to carry out a military retaliation for much the same reason that the previous Bush administration decided to cease military retaliations against Libya-only in this case, the threat of hostilities was considerably greater-and that is that it was not going to be a productive act. It was known within the administration that U.S. facilities around the world would immediately be attacked by Iranian intelligence operatives from the IRGC and the MOIS.

And quite simply at this time, it was felt that a war with Iran was not something we wanted particularly because Khatami had just been elected, and there was the hope for moderation in Iran and that eventually America's best chance for getting a hold of the people who had been involved in the bombing rested with a change in the complexion of the Iranian government.

In August of 1998, the two embassies were blown up in East Africa, and on August 20 of that month, the United States struck terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and the al-Shifa plant in Khartoum in Sudan. The strike against the terrorist camps in Afghanistan was pretty much universally accepted as proportionate and appropriate. The strike against Sudan, as everyone will remember, was extremely controversial, and caused an enormous amount of both international and domestic criticism of the administration. The decision to bomb the plant in Sudan was predicated on intelligence that had been presented only a few weeks before. The key parts of the intelligence that were made public later were, first, a connection between Osama bin Laden and the Military Industrial Corporation, which was a sort of parastatal firm of the Sudanese government that was involved in the production of chemical weapons. And, second, the very famous soil sample that was collected just outside the al-Shifa plant in Khartoum, which demonstrated the presence of the chemical EMPTA, which is essentially the immediate precursor for the nerve agent VX, one of the most lethal compounds ever created.

The decision making process within the administration, without going into all the tick-tock and the various meetings, basically came down to the consideration that al-Qaeda had shown a predisposition to carry out catastrophic terrorist attacks. The attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were extraordinary in the indiscriminateness of the violence. More than two hundred and some odd people were killed just so that twelve Americans could be killed, and more than five thousand people were injured. And this was considered an extremely unusual terrorist attack and showed none of the usual restraint characteristic of terrorists who usually don't want to alienate potential sympathizers. Many Muslims were killed in that attack.

That was part of the Washington's calculation, and there was a trail of intelligence that suggested that al-Qaeda was interested in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and using them against the United States. It has been noted since 9/11 -- it was written in the New York Times for example- that in the short period before the attack there were intelligence intercepts about the desire to cause a spectacular or "Hiroshima", in fact. I don't think it's ever been written up, but there were already intercepts to that effect before the August '98 attacks. The fact is, until the August attacks, there had never been a bin Laden operation that had his fingerprints on it. And those bombings made it very clear that he wanted to kill Americans in large numbers. And the feeling was, I missed the conversation about the Lockean compact, but I think the feeling was that no sitting American president could allow a terrorist group with known interest in chemical weapons and likely access to them to carry out such an attack.

And so the strike was ordered against Khartoum. As I think everyone knows, it was ordered for the middle of the night to minimize human casualties. One night watchman was killed. Of course, the American press and by and large the American public was not persuaded of the righteousness of this cause, as lots of questions were raised about such things as the chain of custody of the soil sample, the actual name on the ownership certificate of the plant, the fact that the Clinton administration made several critical errors in briefing the attack, not least, not knowing -- at least top officials did not know because they got the wrong information from the intelligence community --, did not know in fact that the pharmaceuticals were made at the plant. And it turned into a public relations debacle.

In the aftermath of the August '98 strikes, the Clinton administration remained poised to take military action against al-Qaeda. Los Angeles class submarines hovered off the coast of Pakistan throughout the remainder of the administration, waiting for good intelligence regarding the whereabouts of the group's command and control cadre. On three occasions, preparations were made to fire missiles. The first time, the information came that intelligence had revealed that there was a camp in the Afghan desert, I believe it was in Helmand province, and there were a lot of land cruisers and tents in a semicircle and a plane, a landing strip, and everyone thought they'd found bin Laden. When we went to find the confirming intelligence, it turned out to be an Emerati hunting party in which several key participants were friends of leading members of the administration. So that was not a very pleasant experience.

This also, I should add, came right on the verge of the U.A.E. agreeing to buy an enormous number of the most advanced fighter planes that the U.S. puts up for sale. And this had been a deal that had been in the works for I think six years. And you can imagine that there were some shaken officials after that.

On two subsequent occasions, the administration got even closer to using military action. At both times, the gyroscopes on the cruise missiles were spun. And on both occasions, the second confirming piece of intelligence, which CIA director George Tenet had deemed to be essential, never could be procured. And as a result, the subs were told to stand down and the shot was never taken. There has been a great deal in the newspapers about covert actions against al-Qaeda within Afghanistan in which lethal force was said to be a possibility, but there is little I can discuss publicly about that.

Other military actions were also contemplated. In fact, the White House, and particularly President Clinton himself, was quite eager to carry out such a mission. On the first occasion, options were requested from the Pentagon, the Pentagon's declared that an operation would need several divisions and an enormous number of force protection units, billions of dollars and many months. This was not the least bit welcome because the White House was looking for a more surgical strike. And it was felt that this was neither feasible nor politically saleable, nor in the interest of the United States because we didn't want to occupy Afghanistan.

The second time around, in 2000, the president specifically approached General Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and asked for a small package, as it's called, of special forces. And there was some discussion within DOD, there were a number of fairly senior officers who thought this was a good idea, because they understood the threat. And they pushed for it. Shelton himself was more nervous and felt that the lack of intelligence and the requirements of force protection were large. Ultimately, it was General Zinni, the commander in chief in the region, who threw up the roadblocks. And when the Chiefs came to brief in the White House, the verdict was that such an operation would be Desert One -- it would be the aborted effort to rescue the American hostage in Tehran in 1980.

So that is pretty much a review of the use of force in that period. I should add that when the strike was carried out in 1998 the argument of preemptive self-defense was made, and I expect it would have been made in any of the other cases had the cruise missiles ever been launched.

Just a few quick observations on how catastrophic terrorism has changed the security environment, really, the strategic environment for the U.S. It seems to me that there's been a historical reversal that needs to be taken into account, and that is that since the advent of al-Qaeda, it is clear that there are non-state actors that are at least as powerful as many states. I have made the argument that in fact, most states in the world could not have carried out an operation like 9/11. If for no other reason, that most states couldn't recruit that many suicide operatives. And that is an invaluable resource to a terrorist organization. But due to technology, the availability of materials for weapons of mass destruction, and the many opportunities that globalization affords to terrorists, they have sort of achieved a unique position in the international system. And I think we need to recognize that we are now in a position where there is a state of warfare, a state of war, between states and non-state actors. And as a result, we need to update our practices and possibly also our laws to take into account that change.

One of the interesting facts about this evolution is that the prudential calculations that state sponsors have traditionally made in carrying out their terrorism calculations that would affect the extent of the violence that they would inflict on their foe, those calculations simply don't exist when you're dealing with a group like al-Qaeda or a group, say, like Aum Shinrikyo. They are simply operating on another level. They're not thinking about attracting sympathizers as much, they're not thinking about becoming negotiating partners, most importantly, with the United States or some other power, and they are not seeking an incremental revision of status quo. They want the kind of revision that none of us could ever contemplate.

And I think that that is really something that we need to take into account when we consider in particular issues of proportionality. Because I just don't know of any other option we have with these terrorist except to completely destroy the group itself. At least as far as possible.

I guess I was also asked to talk a little bit about issues of state complicity. My feeling is that there's been less change in this regard than might meet the eye despite the arguments of the Bush administration, which we talked about a little before. Most states will continue to exercise some caution in terms of how much they assist groups like al-Qaeda because they can't control them. The history of state sponsorship is you only get involved with someone you can control. So a group like Hezbollah is a case in point, it's always had to answer to its masters in Syria and Iran. Al-Qaeda has never acknowledged the real control of any other group, and that's part of the reason it eventually got run out of Sudan.

I'm going to leave it at that because I don't want to go on for too long. Let me just say in concluding I think that one case that suggests how we're going to update our practices in dealing with the war on terrorism is provided by the attack in Yemen recently involving the Predator. But I think that this is a perfect case that can get blown out of proportion. Very few countries are ever going to allow the United States to have armed aircraft carrying ammunitions on their soil. And by and large, the need for cooperation from these host governments is always going to determine American policymaking. So we may see more of that in places like Afghanistan and Yemen and perhaps Indonesia, and even Somalia. But I don't expect that that will become the norm, and we will ever see that kind of action or almost never, because of the need for host government cooperation. And I will stop there.