Social Science Research Council

September 28 - October 3, 2002 Moscow, Russia

Plenary Session:
"THE WAR ON TERORISM: AT HOME AND ABROAD"
Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN) October 2, 2002

Chair: Thomas Biersteker (Chair of the GSC Program Committee) Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown Univ.

Speakers:

Mustapha K. El-Sayyid (GSC Committee Member)
Center for the Study of Developing Countries at Cairo University

Daniel García-Peña (GSC Committee Member)
Director Planeta Paz, Colombia

Carolina G. Hernandez (GSC Committee Member)
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines

Mary Kaldor (GSC Committee Member)
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics

Francis Loh (GSC Committee Member)
School of Social Sciences at University Sains Malaysia

Sergey M. Rogov
Director, Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN), Moscow

Valery Mazing
Director, Center for Trans-Atlantic Security at ISKRAN, Moscow

Mustapha El-Sayyid

Mustapha began with a discussion of how the definition of terrorism is problematic. Then he proceeded to discuss conditions under which the use of armed force by citizens against the government could be justified (i.e. in situations where there are deep and profound denials of human rights over long periods of time). He discussed different types of terrorism, including state terrorism, which he posited might be on the decline today.

He discussed the importance of giving greater consideration to root causes of terrorist activities, stressing the amount of global inequality that provides a fertile environment for the production of terrorists and their sympathasizers. He further posited that reliance on military means to combat terrorism is likely to prove counter-productive.

Mustapha stressed that there is often a facile identification of Islam with terrorism, but reminded us that the vast majority of Islamists are not terrorists. Osama bin Laden is not representative among Islamists. He also referred to the emergence of religious fundamentalisms of different forms throughout the world.

Finally, he concluded by suggesting that the war against terrorism is being used as a pre-text for an American attack on Iraq. But he cautioned that launching attacks against Iraq would undermine the war on terrorism.


Daniel García-Peña

Looking at the year since 9-11 from the perspective of Colombia, Daniel described the significance of having the FARC identified by the EU as a terrorist organization. He characterized this as an element of the globalization of the FARC. He next stressed the shift in US policy and what he called the return of counter-insurgency efforts in Colombia. He also noted that the previous focus (nearly exclusive focus) on the issue of drugs had been altered to include exploration of the relationship between drug income and the financing of terrorist groups.

In terms of changes within Colombian politics, Daniel mentioned that the Colombian government had introduced a program encouraging neighbors to observe and report on potentially suspicious activities of other neighbors, a program similar to the TIPs program US Attorney General Ashcraft tried (but failed) to introduce in the US. He also mentioned the strong support the Colombian government has declared for the US over the course of the past year. He concluded with a discussion of how the militarization of the issue and the return of counter-insurgency would likely divert resources from economic development and the provision of social welfare.


Carolina G. Hernandez

Carolina began with a statement of hope that the US would maintain (or return) to multilateral approaches to policy. She cautioned that the US focus on Iraq and the concerns raised in the "axis of evil" speech would undermine the global effort against terrorism.

With regard to the implications for international relations and our understanding of war, Carolina suggested that the Westphalian norm of non-intervention was under strong attack.

She next addressed the regional implications of the global effort against terrorism, with specific references to the special difficulties faced by Indonesia (with its large Muslim population and ethnic fragmentation), by the Philippines (with its extremist organizations operating in the southern part of the country), and by Singapore (which was shocked to find itself at risk in the plot uncovered to attack both US and Singapore facilities). She also stressed the increase in intelligence sharing within the region under the auspices of ASEAN.

Finally, she concluded that the "war on terrorism" serves internal political goals within the Philippines. Mrs. Arroyo has used it as an opportunity for the modernization of the military (which greatly pleases a critical group that she needs for political support) as well as for enhancing its capacity to counter domestic terrorism, and armed opposition to government.


Francis Loh

Francis began with asking whether the attacks of 9-11 and their aftermath constituted a turning point of some kind in Southeast Asia. He answered by suggesting that the answer was both yes and no. No, because the latest US initiatives is a continuation of its long-term goal towards global hegemony which was so evident in the region during the Vietnam War era. Yes, because several Southeast Asian leaders have warmed up to Washington again. This is a change because ties between the region and Washington had been put on the back-burner since the end of the Cold War, if not even earlier.

After joining Washington's war against terrorism, several Southeast Asian governments have begun to arrest not only radical Muslims for alleged ties with the Talibans and al-Qaeda as in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines but also other opposition groups as well. Although Washington has clarified time and again that it is not anti-Islam, Muslims view themselves as targeted in this war. The bombing of Afghanistan and the lack of concern, as they view it, of the Palestinian plight have further fueled anti-US sentiments and increased support for radical Islamic groups in the region.

The net effect is that "the middle ground is being eroded" and the struggle for democracy and human rights has been rolled back. Perhaps it is necessary for the region's NGOs who have been at the forefront of this struggle to address global political developments more. To counter US hegemony, it might be necessary to promote Southeast Asian regionalism, perhaps also to develop closer ties with Europeans.


Mary Kaldor

Mary began with reference to Frances' point about the erosion of the middle ground, suggesting that there has been a "squeezing of the middle ground" to the extent that the human rights agenda was threatened both by terrorism and by the responses to the terrorist attacks.

With regard to the "war" on terrorism, she suggested three things. First, 9-11 is an example of a "new war." That is, the terrorist threat comes from a network (consisting of a blurring of both non-state and state elements). The objective of terrorist violence is to increase both fear and insecurity, and it is financed by both criminalized and diverse sources. Second, she asserted that there are articulate alternatives to the path being taken in law, in human rights discourse and activities, and in the International Criminal Court. Third, US reactions are predictable and are an illustration of "spectacle war." They come out of the American experience with the Cold War (the legacy of deterrence) and involve the unacceptability of any US casualties and the use of air power that destroys infrastructure (and ultimately contributes to the creation of an environment that fosters further illicit activities).

Iraq poses an important dilemma. In spite of the fact that the Hussein regime is horrific and its elimination would be a positive outcome, any kind of war is problematic. If it is short and successful, it will strengthen the propensity for the US to engage in spectacle war elsewhere (though it offers the best outcome for the Iraqi people). If it is long and protracted, it will weaken the continued use of pre-emption by the US, but would be a tragedy for the people of Iraq.


Sergey Rogov

Rogov began with a characterization of the "new terrorism" with the important observation that it is a perverted legacy of the Cold War (reminding us that the Al-Qaeda network emerged out of the US effort to combat Soviet forces in Afghanistan) and that both of the superpowers had engaged in the creation of clandestine civilian armies. He also related the new terrorism to globalization and commented on the technologies of globalization (the way terrorist networks use global technology), how the inequalities associated with globalization provided an impetus for recruitment to terrorist networks (from the ranks of the losers), and that there is a social basis for opposition to globalization because it has destroyed traditional ways of life in so many parts of the world. Like Mustapha, Rogov also described the global emergence of religious fundamentalisms and extremism of different forms (that have been creating paradises in the next world).

Rogov next discussed the legitimacy of the response to the attacks of 9-11. He argued that the militarization of the response undermined the legitimacy of the actions taken. He warned about the emergence of a new form of McCarthyism in the US, he cautioned about dangerous precedents being established for pre-emption internationally and about a general acceptance of "the theory of the lesser evil" in justifications for responses to terrorism.

He went on to talk about the need for a comprehensive approach in the global effort against terrorism, including efforts to bridge the North/South gap, finding ways to avoid the clash of civilizations, and pursuing the development goals discussed at the Johannesberg summit.

Rogov concluded with a discussion of the problems associated with Chechnya, describing it as a "tragedy, and a failure." He elaborated on the double standards introduced globally with regard to the recognition of the self-determination claims of different peoples (why Bosnia and not Kosovo, why the Palestinians and not the Kurds, why Estonia and not Chechnya). He concluded with the observation that the development of pre-emptive doctrines was the greatest threat facing us today and that it implied that there were "no rules for the 21st century."


Valery Mazing

Mazing described terrorism as a product of uneven development, citing growing disparities between rich and poor. He posited that at the end of the 19th century average incomes in the richest countries were 9 times those of the poor, and that at the end of the 20th century, the income gap between the rich and the poor had risen to more than 100 to 1.

He next discussed globalization processes in finance and information. He suggested that the spread of information was "out of control" hence opportunities for manipulation increased and illustrated his argument with reference to the media domination and the role it played in motivating action over Kosovo and turning public opinion against only one party.

He also said, that fanaticism which is a native brother of terrorism, is brought to life not only by poverty, but also by ignorance, based on intolerance. This ignorance has been cultivated deliberately for several decades. The ruling circles of some Moslem tried to avoid the threat of social discontent with the help of different means, including the way of stimulating the darkest sides of fanatic Islam and channeling it against the external enemy. Some experts, also in Russia, he said, consider that this is the real reason of the present situation where many Islamic countries have neither democracy, no secular state, civil society, law, free press, trade unions, etc. Those forms of society management give significant tools to influence the population. Including an opportunity to exploit such motives as priority of future life over the present one, intolerance to infidels, etc. All that spiritually shapes kamikaze terrorists.

He used a disease metaphor to discuss the emergence and spread of terrorism and said that the treatment of this illness should be complex. And may be those who see some positive aspects in the loud bell that rang in September 1999 in Moscow and Volgodonsk and on September 11th in New-York and D.C. are right - there is still some time to stop the widening cancer disease before international terrorists can get nuclear, bacteriological or other terrible weapons. It is very important that understanding has emerged (and it is growing) of necessity of serious changes if we want modern civilization to survive without colliding with each other. Quite logical seems to transform the current antiterrorist organization into something similar to an alliance that would undertake the task of radical improvement of the world situation. The world actually needs a comprehensive program of protection against terrorism. It means that discussions and decisions in such a unique forum as the UN, uniting all states of the globe, will be required. It is necessary to determine the rules to fight terrorists and what measures should the states take to cut the extremist organizations' financial channels. It is important to find consensus concerning what measures should be taken to punish those who will not submit to the rules agreed upon.

Probably the most important question is connected with the possibility of using military force. It could be useful either to restore the present rules, according to which the use of force is regulated by the UN Security Council, or to draw up new, but also generally accepted game rules. Mazing concluded with the observation that he did not expect to see Russian intervention in or war with Georgia.


Thomas Biersteker

It is hard to say anything "new," given the quality of the previous presentations and the extent to which the US is always so much better known to those located outside of the country than the US is knowledgeable about the rest of the world (there are asymmetries of knowledge). Therefore, I attempted an interpretive understanding of the evolution of US policy after 9-11. To do so, I utilized a device we often use with critical oral history projects at the Watson Institute. That is, in order to understand critical decisions, how former allies became adversaries, or whether and how history might have turned out differently, we engage in the analysis of counterfactual alternatives. More specifically, we engage in examining how critical branching points historically enabled some possibilities, while at the same time, they foreclosed others. Thus, my purpose was to understand just how we got the point we are today, to understand the movement from initial shock from the attacks and strategies of counter terrorism to the "doctrine" of pre-emption and an impending attack against Iraq.

There have been four critical, or decisive, branching points in the US policy response to 9-11 that brought us to the point we are today: the verge of an attack against Iraq.

First, was the decision taken just a few days after the attacks (in September of 2001), to define the attacks as an act of war, rather than as a crime against humanity. There were debates, both within the country and within the government (particularly, the State Department) about this choice. By making a rhetorical declaration of war (like the war on poverty, the war on drugs - this "war" has not formally been declared by the US Congress) the Bush administration foreclosed the possibility of utilizing human rights law, multilateral criminal investigations, the International Criminal Court, and mobilizing international institutions on behalf of a global effort against terrorism.

Second, was the decision to move from a carefully parsed declaration of war against global terrorism (terrorist organizations with a global reach) to a global war against all forms of terrorism, wherever it exists or is defined by states). In effect this meant broadening the campaign against Al-Qaeda to a campaign against Hamas, Hezbollah, Basque separatists, the IRA, the FARC, Kashmiri separatists, Chechnyans, obscure Chinese minority groups, etc. This action was not immediate. It was gradual. But by the time the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians flared up again in March and April of 2002, it was evident in the ever-growing group of terrorist organizations listed by the US in its global effort to freeze terrorist finances and coordinate intelligence efforts. This broadening in the identification of the adversary resulted in a substantial broadening of the strategic campaign against terrorism.

Third, the early, and relatively "easy" way in which the Taliban regime was overthrown in Afghanistan - the result of what Mary described as "spectacle war" - lead the US to conclude that quick, decisive military intervention, with the support of local ground troops, worked and could be used against other potential terrorist havens pre-emptively. Thus, the rapid success of the military campaign against Afghanistan emboldened the US to legitimize pre-emption as a strategy. This move was evident by December of 2001 and was picked up by the Israeli's with their increasingly bold interventions into the Palestinian territories to combat terrorist groups and organizations in March and April of 2002, by the Indians with regard to Kashmir, and by the Russians with regard to the Chechnyans operating out of Georgia in August of 2002. The idea was inscribed as "doctrine" by the US in September of 2002.

Fourth, the "axis of evil" speech at the end of January of 2002 identified states as adversaries, in addition to terrorist organizations. Not only does this take the exploration of root causes of terrorism off the agenda, but it also identifies an adversary against which the US is better prepared to fight. The search for a linkage between terrorism and tyrant states ultimately leads to the articulation of the idea of a "nexus" between terrorism and tyrant states, and ultimately to the reprise of an attack against Iraq in August of 2002. This move has obvious political benefits for the Bush administration (able to take corporate scandals and poor economic performance off the agenda in an election year) - a point similar to those made by Daniel with regard to Colombia and by Carolina with regard to the Philippines.

There are two major implications of this analysis of critical branching points and the path to pre-emptive attack against Iraq.

First is the (re)-discovery of the state and state-building project. The argument increasingly being made is that effective states will not and cannot harbor terrorists - the famous "you are either with us, or you are against us" speech in September of 2001. Thus, it has increasingly become the imperial project of the US to provide state-building support to "freedom-loving" states (without defining precisely what that means, but probably those willing to ally with the US in the "war" on terrorism). It also means the abandonment of a search for root causes, the militarization of foreign policy, the "securitization" of policy in other arenas, and the re-instantiation of the state more generally.

Second, are the challenges to international law, democratization, and human rights. Increasingly, it is beginning to appear that the postwar norm of sovereign non-intervention is being abandoned in an odd alliance of US hawks and humanitarian interventionists. As Sergey Rogov suggested, we are entering a period "without rules," perhaps a brave new world order. This confronts us with important questions about the legitimation of pre-emption: just who will decide when pre-emption is justified, based on what criteria? These are fundamentally normative questions.

To conclude, we have seen the articulation of a new doctrine during the past month (September 2002), but ultimately, the practices of pre-emption will be more important than the articulation of the doctrine. How far, and how widely, pre-emptive interventions are undertaken is yet to be determined. There are obvious prospects for imperial overstretch on the part of the US, just as there are potential prospects for restraint. In the final analysis, history is not pre-determined, and the future remains open-ended. The path from 9-11 to the doctrine of pre-emptive intervention was not pre-determined - it did not have to work out in this particular way. There were choices taken at critical branching points along the way. Similarly, the erosion of the principle of sovereign non-intervention and its replacement with justifications for pre-emptive intervention is not pre-determined. Thus, while an attack against Iraq appears highly likely to us in October of 2002, it is not inevitable. It is, at least in part, a product of what we do as citizen-practitioners throughout the world.