Social Science Research Council

OPPORTUNITIES IN DISORDER? ACADEMICS, GOVERNMENTS AND THE ALTERNATIVE SECURITY AGENDA IN EAST ASIA-A CONVERSATION WITH DR. JAMES T. H. TANG
By Sophia Woodman

Dr. James T. H. Tang is Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Hong Kong, and a professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration. Dr. Tang led his department's work on a project on non-traditional security in Asia under the auspices of the United Nations University (UNU), funded by the Ford Foundation. The project was launched in February 2000, and the final meeting was held in June 2002. UNU is now in the process of editing some of the materials produced by the project for publication. HKU was one of three focal points on northeast Asia for the project, and chose to concentrate on studying intra- and inter-regional cooperation and institutions. Dr. Tang is currently exploring developing cross-disciplinary work at the university on human security issues, and is looking forward to a possible Phase II of the UNU project, which would seek to develop greater conceptual clarity on the scope of alternative security.

Sophia Woodman: How has the move towards exploring alternative conceptions of security been reflected in East Asian region?

James Tang: The so-called "alternative approach" to security problems is now more accepted in the region as an area worth looking at or studying, but it is still alternative, and among governments in the region, some are ready to engage and see practical implications for the alternative approach to security. Some other governments are engaging in these discussions more because they don't want to be left out, they don't want to be seen to be totally ignorant about some of these issues. So there is still some way to go. Partly this is political in nature, because for some governments, these ideas are linked with Western initiatives. Partly this is a resource issue, whether resources should be allocated to research in these areas. So in that sense, the whole idea of alternative security will have to wait before it seriously becomes a general focus of government attention.

Some individual governments have really put it on their agendas, and Japan, in particular, and Canada and Australia have been very positive about taking them on board. They do have very different positioning, they approach it very differently, with different definitions of human security. There are overlapping ideas, but they are putting different emphasis on the aspects of the broad definition of human security. And also there is the establishment of the Human Security Network of individual governments and institutions. (For more information see: Human Security Network.)

Academically, there are attractions to these ideas, and particularly to me after the end of the Cold War this represents a different way of approaching security problems. But conceptually it is still rather contentious, and not everyone is convinced that this is a better way of analyzing or treating some of the problems in question, even though most people acknowledge the importance of issues on the alternative security agenda that threaten security at the individual level, such as poverty, environmental protection, human rights. The boundaries of the field have to be defined more clearly before it will attract more attention, and more rigorous work can be done. There are people who are watching and waiting to see if there are results in terms of that kind of analysis.

Despite all the contention, the idea seems to have gathered some momentum, partly because the United Nations is behind it, and then a few governments have been willing to put it on the agenda, so that somehow generated support and interest. There are of course individuals who are active in promoting this new alternative security agenda. Now a kind of embryonic network has emerged, and some institutions are more rigorous in trying to help and facilitate the discussion. There is at least sufficient interest and willingness to engage in dialogue and discussion, even though it is still not quite an issue which has been accepted in general as an area of very fruitful investigation. But on the whole there are enough people working on this to carry it forward.

SW: Have any distinctive approaches emerged that point to a regional identity in such inquiries, or regional focus points in terms of issues, that may be different from the issues scholars have been focusing on in other regions? Are there particular concerns for scholars looking into this area in East Asia?

JT: All the broad issues are on the agenda of interest to people in the region. But the way people approach them may be different. Take the example of human rights, where differences over so-called "values," particularism versus universalism, and all those other debates are still something that people have to deal with in the region. The same problem of human rights in a European context would be analyzed differently.

That is one reason for the political resistance to addressing this issue in the security framework; some governments are a bit suspicious. But there are also very challenging problems for the region which are high on the agenda and could be alternative security issues, such as the social impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In a sense, the Asian financial crisis and the resulting economic problems have provided some more room for investigation, analysis, government attention and some resources.

The economic downturn intensified existing social problems, such as prostitution, drugs, poverty, social divisions. Traditionally, of course, these are all issues on the developmental agenda, or sometimes they are seen as law and order problems, or humanitarian issues. First of all, these issues are becoming more serious in some areas, and second, they have sometimes created more tensions between communities, and even challenged relationships between countries in the region.

Of course not all governments see such things as alternative security problems. But the issues themselves have become more important, and there are more people looking at these problems, some from a security perspective.

Another example is the environment. Specific environmental problems are becoming quite pronounced in the region, in some areas it is getting worse and worse, and the problem easily spreads from one country to the other. Japan, Korea and China are trying to address some of these problems, but at the moment there are barriers to serious collaboration. However, there are now more attempts to enter into dialogues and negotiations.

So in the region there are real reasons why the issues on the alternative security agenda are being more seriously looked at and investigated.

SW: China scholars Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg write, "China has yet to acknowledge the interdependent nature of security."(1) In addition, domestically China has used the concept of "national security" to suppress dissent and there is no public discussion of what this concept actually means. What particular challenges do Beijing's attitudes pose for developing cooperative approaches to alternative security issues in the region?

JT: As a major player, China, like the United States, tends to prefer bilateral, rather than multilateral approaches to dealing with some of these problems. But in terms of the broader agenda, when they actually think about what would affect China's security a principal consideration is to what extent the issue in question really has a domestic impact. When one looks at what is happening in the region, it may be an overstatement to say China does not accept interdependence in security.

Some scholars in China are now working on alternative security issues. But they are not taking away resources from the national security establishment. Those who are working in this area are usually from other academic institutions, which are developing such research using external resources or funding. The up-side is their flexibility, they are not blocked by the national security establishment, but meaningful impact on the agenda of national security in China is really minimal, because national security people are not really devoting time or paying that much attention. Frankly speaking, it is not really the priority of those who are responsible for national security.

However, because in other parts of the region this notion of alternative security is being discussed, people in the policy community in China, including some of those in the defense and foreign policy areas, are certainly now more aware of some of the issues that are part of the alternative security agenda. China will at least have to be aware of what's going on, so they have people attending these kinds of meetings and conferences, and they have people who have to deal with this and some of the basic discussions.

So far, there is still a degree of skepticism among people in traditional security that I have met in China. They just want to listen and talk about this, and basically show me that they know this is one of the issues on the agenda, but they are still quite skeptical, both on what is behind the initiative-Western governments are more interested in the alternative security approach-and also there are still people who are not convinced that these are real security challenges in a traditional sense. They may accept that some of these issues are becoming important, but they still want to focus on the more military-focused work that they have been doing.

So to what extent there has been any change in mentality, even in other countries this is still an ongoing process, and in China it is even more difficult. They are willing to engage on specific issues, like environmental protection, for instance, or certain aspects of transnational crime, like drug trafficking. The diversification of bureaucratic interests sometimes gets in the way of a unified approach. An example is the AIDS issue, and the arrest of independent activist Wan Yanhai.(2) Some people within the system pushed for his release, but at the provincial level the public security people felt that he had violated state secrets laws. If we think of human security in that broad sense, then China certainly has become engaged, but they might not link that engagement up with what they see as a security agenda.

SW: What emerged from the main findings of the HKU study on institutionalization and cooperation in the region? Did this point some ways forward for the field?

JT: Well, it is well-known Asia is not very institutionalized as a region. But maybe there is no need to have a specific form of regional cooperation in a rigid structure which is very tidy and parallel to structures in places like Europe. The geography, history and politics of the Asian region present that as a reality, so these sort of issues have to be dealt with in a terrain which is very different, and you have to find different ways of dealing with specific issues.

One of the things we have tried to do is to develop a better mapping of the different types of institutions and organizations, and to analyze to what extent that would help in trying to connect things together and encourage greater sharing of resources to deal with some of the problems.

Perhaps not too surprisingly, the findings of the HKU study revealed a very variegated picture of institutionalization across these many different issues. Some of the existing global regimes are more effective than others in dealing with local problems. For example, the global regime for human rights doesn't really manage to do anything very substantive, even though there is some engagement with the United Nations, whereas in poverty alleviation, there are a number of organizations that have carried out some very concrete projects.

The degree of institutionalization at the regional level varies from one area to another. In broad, generic terms, the economic institutions are better developed, the security/political ones are not really properly institutionalized. For the social issues, there are so many different types, and each one may be governed by different types of regimes. On the whole, you can document a lot more cooperation than in the past, like environmental dialogues. The problem is all these initiatives are independent of each other, not really linked, and there's no coherence to the interrelationships of these institutions. Some times they are driven by specific pragmatic considerations, a particular environmental problem, for example, sometimes they are driven by more formalistic, diplomatic concerns that something should be in place.

But in some specialized areas, some degree of governance is emerging. For example, one project is on information technology, and partly for commercial reasons, partly due to concerns about electronic crime, there are some international regulatory frameworks, but of course they are addressing a particular concern, not necessarily the broader issues of human security. In the same set of frameworks, for example on illegal migrants, there are some very strong, determined law enforcement efforts in sending or receiving countries, but these do not deal so well with the transnational elements, so they have not been very effective.

The role of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is also quite an important one, since on many of these issues, like poverty and environmental problems, NGOs have always been quite active. Of course, some of the NGOs have dialogues not only among themselves, but also with individual governments. And sometimes it is easier for them to address problems directly, rather than always using governmental intervention.

Academics need to ask more serious questions about the role of civil society in this region. Civil society is still relatively weak, but compared to the past we do see a more dynamic picture. Even though it is weak, it has really grown, and there is a need for understanding to what extent civil society organizations actually contribute to this kind of regional cooperation.

In general we all accept that civil society is important, particularly on all the issues on the alternative security agenda, since these are issues that a lot of NGOs have been working on for a long time, although from a different angle or perspective. We need to understand a bit more about their approaches. Another question is, if they have been doing all this work, to what extent has this been a successful strategy for resolving these issues, particularly those linked to the security concerns.

Of course, though some of the NGOs are working on areas that are connected to the human security agenda, they might not be interested in looking at them from a human security perspective. You can't really expect civil society to deal with those problems from a security perspective.

My guess is that some of these organizations have the potential to deal with some of these issues, and to help minimize possibilities for violence and reduce inter-community tensions. If they are not able to do this, we have to ask questions to find out exactly why, since they seem to be the ones that are most suited, given the current context in the region: the ambivalence of governments and the lack of region-wide institutions. Or maybe this is more a resource issue, then there would be the possibility of strengthening some of the NGOs. These are some of the ideas that we will try to discuss in our project.

So, in general it is not a very clear picture, it is quite messy, actually. Our conclusion is that it is so fragmented at this stage that the institutions at the regional level as a whole cannot really be very effective. Of course the region as a whole is still divided by all these different ideological problems and political differences, so that might be a barrier, but there probably is more than we realize in terms of what's happening, in terms of what people are doing, institutional dialogues and organized activities. Perhaps if there is more thinking along these lines, there are some existing institutional arrangements which could be more effectively used, or directed to create a better framework for cooperation.

SW: What has been the impact of September 11 on this kind of research and focus in the region?

JT: The final major gathering for the UNU study that brought together participants from the whole region took place not long after September 11. Some of the project leaders were quick to point out that the event really demonstrated the importance of this alternative security agenda, because we are dealing with enemies who might be invisible, issues which cut across national boundaries and threats which come from different directions and in different forms.

In a curious sort of way, they felt that September 11 was "positive," in the sense that it actually forced people to think about security from a different perspective. But the downside is of course that the particular challenge of how to deal with the terrorists, and how to tighten security measures has become a major preoccupation, and has meant that resources are being moved to that area and priorities shifted, and there is quite a strong military element in some of the thinking about counter-terrorism.

Although fundamentally it strengthened the argument for alternative security, in terms of immediate preoccupations, it has drawn attention away from human rights and some of the other issues on the non-traditional security agenda.

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NOTES:

1. See Elizabeth Economy, and Michel C. Oksenberg. China Joins the World, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 30.

2. Wan was released in late September after being detained without charge in Beijing for a month. See Human Rights Watch for more information.


Sophia Woodman is Research Director of the organization Human Rights in China (HRIC), where she has worked for the past 10 years, the last five of them based in Hong Kong. Prior to HRIC, Sophia worked as a freelance journalist and translator in Beijing and the US. She has a B.A. in Chinese studies and an M.Sc. in politics, both from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and an M.S. in journalism from Columbia University. Ms. Woodman holds a GSC professional fellowship for research and training on her project entitled "The Impact of The Lack of Systematic Human Rights Monitoring in China on Internationally Funded Legal Reform Programs."